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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon1, substantial 
uncertainty still exists as to when timber harvesting, clearing of other 
vegetation, leveling of land, or other modification or alteration of wildlife 
habitat (either on publicly or privately-owned land), will violate the "takings" 
prohibitions2 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").3 In its Sweet Home 
Chapter decision, the Supreme Court held that a regulation4 promulgated by 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), providing that "harm" 
and a "taking" in violation of the ESA may occur when modification of 
habitat of an animal kills or "injures" the animal, is not facially invalid. 
The Sweet Home Chapter decision, however, did not determine how 
this FWS regulation should be interpreted and applied in the myriad 
situations where the habitat of protected wildlife is modified. Consequently, 
courts and commentators continue to disagree on the issues of what kinds and 
types of adverse impacts on a member of a protected species caused by 
habitat modification can be considered to "harm" ("actually" kill or injure) 
and "take" an animal. Disagreement also exists on what kinds of evidence are 
required to prove that habitat modification has "harmed" a protected animal 
in violation of the ESA's takings prohibitions. 
This Article analyzes the ESA' s prohibitions on the taking of animals 
that are members of a protected species of fish or wildlife and the Supreme 
• ProfessorofLaw, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Cornell University (1968); 
Yale Law School (1971). The author served as co-counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants in 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 148 P.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1081 (1999). The viewpoints expressed in this Article are those of the 
author and not those of either the Plaintiffs-Appellants or co-counsel in that litigation. 
I 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
2 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B)-(C) (2000); 50 C.P.R.§§ 17.3, 17.31 (2002). 
3 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
4 50 C.P.R.§ 17.3 (2002). 
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Court's Sweet Home Chapter ·decision. The Article will then analyze 
contemporary judicial and scholarly positions on the types of adverse impacts 
on protected animals caused by habitat modification that will constitute an 
"injury" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. The Article also 
examines the kinds of circumstantial and direct evidence that will be 
considered sufficient to prove that a taking in violation of the ESA has been 
proximately caused by modification of habitat of a protected animal. 
This Article concludes that a protected animal should be considered 
to be "injured" and "taken" in violation of the ESA not only when 
modification of the habitat causes a serious and permanent physical injury, 
wound, or disease to a protected animal, but also when habitat modification 
otherwise significantly adversely affects a protected animal, even 
temporarily, by significantly impairing the animal's feeding, sheltering, 
breeding, or reproduction. Proof of harming a protected ariimal by modifying 
its habitat, in violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions, should be available 
through circumstantial evidence (including data garnered by monitoring of 
telemetry transmissions from a protected animal or proof of a reduction of 
the population of members of a protected species within a particular habitat 
after that habitat has been modified) as well as by different kinds of direct 
evidence (including field observations of a protected animal or videotape of 
the actions and behavior of a protected animal). 
ll. PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE HABIT AT UNDER THE ESA 
The ESA not only seeks to prevent the extinction of listed endan-
gered5 and threatened species6 of fish, birds, other wildlife, and plants/ but 
also seeks recovery of listed species by increasing the population of listed 
species so that the species no longer need to be listed under and protected by 
the ESA. 8 In addition to seeking to protect members of listed species from 
5 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000) (defining an "endangered species" as "any species [other 
than certain excluded insect pests] which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range"). 
6 See id. § 1532(20) (defining "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become 
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion 
of its range"). 
7 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 690 
(1995). 
8 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(3) (2000). See also Sierra Club v. United States Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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death or harm caused by direct application of.force through the prohibition 
and punishment of the import, export, killing, possession, and sale of 
protected listed anirrials,9 the ESA also attempts to safeguard listed animals 
from .indirect harm by protecting the habitat of endangered and threatened 
species of fish and wildlife from destruction or adverse alteration or 
modification. 10· 
The protection of habitat oflisted species of animals is accomplished 
not only by governmental acquisition and preservation of habitat, 11 but also 
by restrictions on both private and governmental actions that adversely 
modify or alter the habitat of protected species of fish and wildlife. 12 Under 
section 5 13 ·Of the ESA, the federal government is authorized to acquire land 
in order to protect wildlife habitat as part of conservation programs for 
endangered and threatened species, "before the seller's activity has harmed 
any endangered animal." 14 Land also may be acquired under section 5 of the 
ESA to prevent "modification of land that is not yet but may in the future 
become habitat for an endangered or threatened species."15 
In addition to restrictions on the modification of wildlife habitat 
under the ESA's takings prohibitions, section 7(a)(2) 16 of the ESA prohibits 
actions carried out or assisted by the federal government that threaten either 
to extinguish a protected species or to modify adversely the designated 
habitat of a protected species. 
A. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA 
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA imposes a broad, affirmative duty17 upon 
each federal administrative agency and departmentto "insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species [of fish, wildlife, or plants] or result in the destruction or adverse 
9 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(F) (2000). 
10 /d.§ 1531(b); Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at698; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 179 (1978). 
II 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (2000). 
12 /d.§§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3, 17.31 (2002). 
13 16 u.s.c. § 1534 (2000). 
14 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 702-03. 
15 /d. at 703. 
16 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(2000). 
17 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703. 
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modification of habitat of such species .... "18 which has been determined to 
be "critical," under ESA sections 4(a)(3)19 and 4(b)(2),20 by the Secretary of 
Commerce or Interior.21 Unlike the FWS regulation defining harm under the 
ESA's takings prohibitions, section 7(a)(2)'s provisions are not limited to a 
habitat modification that actually kills or injures members of a protected 
species.22 
However, in order for section 7(a)(2) to apply to an action of a private 
individual, business, or state or local government, the action must be 
licensed, permitted, or funded by the federal government.23 Furthermore, 
section 7(a)(2) applies only to "actions in which there is discretionary 
Federal involvement or control,"24 and therefore does not apply to an action 
that an agency is required to perform "if certain statutory criteria are met."25 
In addition, section 7(a)(2) does not apply to an action that is solely the 
action of a private person, business, or state or local government, with no 
involvement of any kind by the federal government.26 
The ESA's takings prohibitions/7 however, apply to "any person,"28 
without regard to whether the person's action either is discretionary or is 
permitted, licensed, or funded by the federal government, with the ESA 
defining person to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, ... or any 
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or 
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or 
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, 
municipality, or political subdivision of a State. "29 
18 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). 
19 /d. § 1533(a)(3). 
20 /d. § 1533(b)(2). 
21 Cf Federico Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, in ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 47 (Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin eds., 
ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 2002) [hereinafter ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT] (explaining that as of Apri130, 2000, critical habitat had been designated under 
the ESA for only 124 of the 1231 domestic species of plants, fish, and wildlife that were 
listed under the ESA as endangered or threatened). 
22 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703. 
23 Proffitt v. Dep't of Interior ex rei. Lujan, 825 F. Supp. 159, 164 (W.D. Ky. 1993). 
24 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2002). 
25 Strahan v. Linnon, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *10 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998). 
26 See Deborah L. Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA § 7 Consultations Over Existing Projects, 
8 NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 17, 17-18. 
27 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B)-(C) (2000). 
28 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995). 
29 16 u.s.c. § 1532(13) (2002). 
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To violate the first clause of section 7(a)(2), an action must threaten 
to make a particular protected species extinct-in other words, the action 
must threaten to kill all existing members ofthe species (thus threatening the 
species' survival).30 This first clause of section 7(a)(2) can be violated by a 
construction project, such as the building of a dam on a river, that threatens 
to extinguish the only known members of a protected species by destroying 
the species' habitat.31 On the other hand, the ESA's takings prohibitions can 
be violated by the killing, injury, or other taking of even one animal that is 
a member of a protected species,32 even if the taking does not threaten to 
extinguish the species.33 
In order to violate the second clause of section 7(a)(2) (protecting a 
species' designated critical habitat), the habitat has to be destroyed or 
adversely modified, and the habitat has to have been designated as "critical" 
by the Secretary of Interior or Commerce.34 The habitat, however, does not 
have to be on land owned by the federal government; both clauses of section 
7(a)(2) can apply to habitat and land that is owned by a private person, 
corporation, or state or local govemment.35 
Under the ESA, an ongoing or proposed action that is, or will be, in 
violation of section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions is required to be halted 
by a court by issuance of an injunction without the court balancing the 
competing equities.36 Neither a federal agency or department that violates 
section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions is subject to civil or criminal 
penalties under section 11 37 of the ESA, nor is an employee or agent of a 
federal agency or department who is responsible for a violation of section 
7(a)(2) subject to any civil or criminal penalties under section 11 of the ESA. 
The ESA seeks to insure that federal agencies and departments 
comply with section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions by requiring federal 
agencies and departments to follow specified procedures prior to taking any 
action that might violate section 7(a)(2). In the case of certain major actions, 
30 See generally Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F. 3d 434 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
31 See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
32 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D. 
Fla. 1995). 
33 /d. 
34 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,703 (1995). 
35 Lawrence R. Liebesman and Steven G. Davison, Takings of Wildlife Under the 
Endangered Species Act After Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon, 5 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 151 (1995). 
36 See Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 153. 
37 16 u.s.c. § 1540 (2000). 
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a federal agency or department first is required to find but, from either FWS 
or the National Marine Fisheries Service C'NMFS"),: if any species of plants, 
fish, or wildlife may be present in the area where the proposed action will 
take place.38 If any members of a listed species or a species proposed to be 
listed under the ESA may be present in the area, the federal agency or 
department is required to prepare a biological assessment that determines 
whether the proposed action will have any adverse effects on any members 
of listed or proposed-for-listing species.39 If an agency or department 
determines, from a biological assessment or from informal consultation40 
with FWS or NMFS, that a listed endangered or threatened species is likely 1 
to be adversely affected by the proposed action, the agency or department 
must consult, formally or informally, with FWS or NMFS, and obtain a 
biological opinion from FWS or NMFS.41 The biological opinion is required 
to determine whether the proposed action will violate section 7(a)(2)'s 
substantive prohibitions and whether mitigation measures are required to 
minimize adverse impacts on protected species.42 If the biological opinion 
concludes that the proposed action would violate section 7(a)(2)'s 
substantive prohibitions, the action cannot go forward, and the agency or 
department must follow an alternative suggested by FWS or NMFS that FWS 
or NMFS believes would not violate section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.43 
B. ESA 's Takings Prohibitions 
Section 9(a)(l)(B)44 of the ESA makes it unlawful for any person45 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take a listed endangered 
species of fish or wildlife within the United States or the territorial seas of 
the United States, and section 9(a)(l)(C)46 of the ESA makes it unlawful for 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take any 
38 Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 543 (D. V.I. 
1998). 
39 /d. 
40 See id. at 545 (finding that an agency is not required to prepare a biological assessment if 
it engages in informal consultation with FWS or NMFS to determine if the agency's 
proposed action will violate section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions). 
41 /d. at 539. 
42 /d. at 543. 
43 /d. 
44 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B) (2000). 
45 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
46 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(C) (2000). 
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endangered species of fish or wildlife upon the high seas, except as otherwise 
provided in two sections47 of the ESA. 48 In addition, section 9(g)49 of the ESA 
makes it "unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States to attempt to commit, solicit another to commit, or cause to be 
committed, any offense defined in ... section [9 of the ESA]"-which 
includes the two previously-mentioned takings prohibitions. 
The ESA defines "take" to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct."50 Acting .under authority granted to it by the ESA to adopt 
"appropriate" regulations to enforce the ESA,51 the FWS, which has authority 
under the ESA to protect terrestrial endangered and threatened species of fish 
and wildlife, 52 has adopted regulations53 defining both "harass" and "harm" 
for purposes of the ESA's taking prohibitions. FWS has defined "harm" in 
the ESA' s definition of "take" to mean "an act which actually kills or injures 
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation 
where it actually kills or injures wildlife [that is a listed endangered or 
threatened species under the ESA] by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."54 Under this 
FWS definition of "harm," modification of the habitat of a protected species 
offish or wildlife can be a prohibited "take" in violation of the ESA.55 FWS, 
47 /d. §§ 1535(g), 1539. 
48 See generally Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking 
Under the Endangered Species Act~ 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155, 164-70 (1995) 
(discussing the statutory and regulatory exemptions from the ESA's general prohibitions on 
takings oflisted endangered and threatened species offish and wildlife). See also infra notes 
78-91 and accompanying text (Exemptions from the ESA's takings prohibitions can be 
granted in Incidental Take Permits issued under 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) and Incidental 
Take Statements issued under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).). 
49 16 u.s.c. § 1538(g) (2000). 
so /d. § 1532(19). 
SJ Jd. § 1540(t). 
52 /d.§ 1532(15); 50 C.P.R.§§ 17 .2(b), 17.11 (2002). The National Marine Fisheries Service 
("NMFS") has jurisdiction under the ESA over endangered and threatened species of marine 
fish and wildlife./d. § 222.101. 
53 50 C.P.R.§ 17.3 (2002). 
54 /d. See also id. § 222.102 ("Harm" is defined similarly for purposes of regulation of 
prohibited takings of endangered and threatened species of marine fish and wildlife under 
the NMFS' s jurisdiction under the ESA. This Article analyzes only the FWS 's definition of 
"harm" under the ESA and the application of this definition to modification of the habitat of 
terrestrial fish and wildlife protected under the ESA.). 
ss See infra notes 137-222 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of the FWS 
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however, has stated that its definition of "harass"56 should not be applied to 
modification or destruction of wildlife habitat since its definition of "harm" 
deals with habitat modification and destruction. 57 
As a result of the ESA's broad definition of "person,"58 these ESA 
prohibitions on taking or causing a taking apply to "an individual, corporation 
... ; any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the 
Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of 
a State ... ; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; [and] 
... any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."59 
Because of this definition of "person" under the ESA, the ESA's takings 
prohibitions do not require, as does section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, a permit, 
license, or funds from the federal government in order to apply to a private 
individual, a corporation, or a state or local government. 
Furthermore, while the second clause of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA 
only applies to wildlife habitat that has been designated as "critical" under 
the ESA, the ESA' s takings prohibitions are applicable to wildlife habitat that 
has not been designated as "critical" under the ESA.60 In addition, the 
application of the ESA's takings prohibitions is not dependent upon who 
owns the land where a taking occurs-the ESA's takings prohibitions are 
applicable on land owned by a private individual,61 a corporation, and a state 
or local government, as well as on land owned by the federal government, 
because the ESA's takings prohibitions only require that a prohibited "take" 
occur "within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States"62 
or "upon the high seas."63 
The FWS's definition of "harm" under the ESA's takings pro-
hibitions consequently is the only provision of the ESA that regulates the 
regulation defining of "harm" and its application to modification of wildlife habitat). 
s6 50 C.P.R.§ 17.3 (2002) (defining "harass" as an intentional or negligent act or omission 
which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to 
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering). 
s1 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412-13 (Sept. 26, 1975). 
SS 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2QQQ). 
S9 /d. 
60 Loggyrhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D. 
Fla. 1995) 
61 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. 515 U.S. 687, 707 n.19 
(1995). 
62 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
63 /d. § 1538(a)(l)(C). 
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modification of habitat of a protected species of wildlife by a private 
individual or corporation or state or local government, when no federal 
permit, license, or funds is involved and when the action does not occur on 
land owned or administered by the federal government (so that section 
7 ( a)(2) of the ESA is inapplicable). 
Although these prohibitions on "takes" in section 9 of the ESA apply 
only to endangered species of fish and wildlife listed under the ESA, the 
FWS has promulgated a regulation64 that generally makes it illegal for any 
person to take a threatened species of fish or wildlife within the United 
States, the territorial seas of the United States, or upon the high seas.65 
These ESA takings prohibitions do not make it illegal for a person to 
take a plant that is a member of a species listed as endangered or threatened 
under the ESA. However, in section 9(a)(2)(B)66 the ESA makes it unlawful, 
except as provided in sections 6(g)(2)67 and 1068 of the ESA, "for any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... to remove and reduce to 
possession" any ... [endangered] species [of plants listed under the ESA] 
from areas under Federal jurisdiction, maliciously damage or destroy any 
such species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy 
any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or 
regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal 
trespass law. 69 
A person who violates the ESA's prohibitions against taking a listed 
endangered or threatened species of wildlife is subject to civil penalties 70 and 
criminal penalties (which can include imprisonment).71 In addition, a court 
64 50 C.P.R.§ 17.31(a) (2002). 
65 This regulation was held to be within the FWS's authority under section 4(d) of the ESA, 
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), in Sweet Home ChapterofCommunitiesfora Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 
P.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994}, reh'g denied, 30 P.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd on other 
grounds, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). FWS, however, has issued special rules, 50 C.P.R.§§ 17.40-
.48 (200 1 ), that permit some otherwise prohibited takings of certain threatened species of fish 
and wildlife, and also has adopted another rule, 50 C.P.R. § 17.32, which authorizes the 
issuance of permits allowing the taking of threatened species of fish and wildlife in certain 
circumstances. 
66 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(2)(B) (2000). 
67 /d. § 1535(g)(2). 
68 !d. § 1539. 
69 See 50 C.P.R.§ 17.61(a)-(c)(l) (2002). See also id. § 17.71(a) (prohibiting, subject to 
some exceptions, the removal and reduction to possession of listed threatened plant species 
from an area under federal jurisdiction). 
70 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (2000). 
71 !d. § 1540(b)(l). 
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can issue an injunction to halt either an ongoing violation of the ESA's 
takings prohibitions or a probable (reasonably certain to occur) future vio-
lation of the ESA's takings prohibitions,72without the traditional balancing 
of the respective equities, 73 in a suit brought in federal district court either by 
the United States Attorney GeneraC4 or by a "person" with standing to sue 
who files a citizen suit under section ll(g)(l)(Af5 of the ESA. 
Although the ESA imposes complex procedural duties upon federal 
agencies and departments to ensure compliance with the affirmative obli-
gations of section 7(a)(2) ofthe ESA,76 neither the ESA nor FWS regulations 
under the ESA impose any procedural duties upon persons subject to the 
ESA' s taking prohibitions to seek to prevent violations of these prohibitions. 
However, a person who is subject to the ESA' s takings prohibitions, and who 
seeks to determine whether an ongoing or proposed future action by that 
person violates or will violate the ESA's takings prohibitions, can request 
that FWS issue a "no-take" opinion letter to the person. "No-take" letters 
state to the requesting person that FWS will not take enforcement action 
under the ESA' s takings prohibitions and enforcement provisions against that 
person's ongoing or proposed action if the person engages in certain 
specified land uses and implements specified mitigation measures set forth 
in a land management plan submitted by the requestor to FWS.77 
If FWS, in an opinion letter or otherwise, determines that a person's 
ongoing or proposed future action violates or will violate the ESA' s takings 
prohibitions, the person can seek an incidental take permit ("ITP") from FWS 
under section 10(a)(l)(B)78 of the ESA, exempting the incidental take of a 
protected species from the ESA's takings prohibitions. An ITP can be issued 
for foreseeable, but not purposeful, takings79 that are caused indirectly80 by 
habitat modification and development projects.81 The FWS may issue an ITP 
72 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1108 (1997). 
73 Davison, supra note 48, at 173-74. 
74 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6) (2000). 
75 !d. § 1540(g)(1)(A). 
76 These procedural duties are discussed supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
77 Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities "Take" Listed 
Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the "Harm" Regulation?, in ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT, supra note 21, at 207, 244. 
78 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (2000). 
79 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,700 (1995). 
80 /d. 
81 /d. at 707. 
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to a person authorizing the taking of an endangered or threatened species of 
wildlife that is otherwise prohibited under the ESA, if the taking "is in-
cidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful 
activity."82 An ITP cannot be issued "for direct, deliberate action against a 
member of an endangered or threatened species."83 
In order to obtain an ITP for an incidental, non-purposeful taking, a 
person must implement a habitat conservation plan ("HCP") approved by the 
FWS, minimizing and mitigating the impacts of the permitted incidental 
taking84 and the FWS must find that the permitted incidental "taking will not 
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species 
in the wild .... "85 
A person is not required to seek an ITP under section 10 of the ESA 
for an action that is violating or will violate the ESA's takings prohibitions, 
but a person is subject to civil and criminal penalties under the ESA if the 
person takes a protected listed animal in violation of the ESA without an ITP 
or other permit or authorization for such taking. 86 
When a proposed action is subject to section 7(a)(2)'s substantive 
requirements and attendant procedural obligations, a person may obtain an 
exemption from the ESA's takings prohibitions by obtaining and complying 
with an incidental take statement ("ITS") issued by the FWS under section 
7(b)(4)87 of the ESA. An ITS is issued by the FWS after formal consultation 
under section 7 ( a)(2) between the FWS and the federal agency or department, 
and after the FWS concludes that the agency action, or a reasonable and 
prudent alternative thereto, will not violate section 7(a)(2) and that the in-
cidental taking of an endangered or threatened species authorized by the ITS 
will not violate section 7(a)(2).88 An ITS is required to specify reasonable 
and prudent alternatives that the FWS considers necessary or appropriate to 
minimize the impact of the incidental taking. 89 
82 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (2000). 
83 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 701. 
84 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
8
' /d. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
86 Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2000). 
87 16 u.s.c. § 1536(b)(4) (2000). 
88 ld. Incidental Take Statements under this authority are discussed in Davison, supra note 
48, at 166-67. 
89 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii)(2000);seea/soAriz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. United States 
Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1242, 1237 (9th Cir. 2001) (declaring that, "absent rare 
circumstances such as those involving migratory species, it is arbitrary and capricious to 
issue an Incidental Take Statement when the Fish and Wildlife Service has no rational basis 
552 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 27:541 
In cases where there is a risk that a person's land development or land 
use may cause a taking ·Of a listed threatened species of fish or wildlife, a 
person may seek to have the FWS issue a special rule under section 4( d)90 of 
the ESA that exempts the· land development or land use from the ESA's 
takings prohibitions.91 
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1995 Sweet Home Chapter 
decision,92 held that the FWS acted within its authority under the ESA in 
including certain modifications of wildlife habitat in its definition of "harm" 
under the ESA' s takings prohibitions. Because of this ruling, persons who are 
planning to harvest timber or to clear and level land inhabited by wildlife 
protected under the ESA, or otherwise to alter the habitat of wildlife pro-
tected under the ESA, must determine whether there is a possibility that their 
proposed land development or land use activity will violate the ESA's 
takings prohibitions. If there is a possibility that a proposed land use dev-
elopment or land use activity may violate the ESA's takings prohibitions, the 
person has several options. He or she may proceed as planned, or abandon 
or alter the plans in order to avoid violating the ESA takings prohibitions, or 
to seek an ITP, ITS, or other exemption from the ESA' s takings prohibitions. 
To proceed according to the original plans risks civil and criminal penalties 
under the ESA if the proposed land development or use does in fact cause a 
violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions. In order to decide which of these 
alternatives to choose in a particular situation, the person needs to understand 
how the FWS regulation defining "harm" under the ESA's takings 
prohibitions has been interpreted by FWS, by the Supreme Court in its Sweet 
Home Chapter decision, and by other courts and scholarly commentators. 
ill. VALIDITY OF THE FWS REGULATION DEFINING HARM AND THE 
SUPREME COURT'S SWEET HOME CHAPTER DECISION 
In 1993 and 1994, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FWS' s regulation defining 
to conclude that a take will occur incident to the otherwise lawful activity"). The standard 
used to determine if there is a "take" that requires an Incidental Take Statement under section 
7 of the ESA is the same standard used to determine if there is a "take" in violation of section 
9 of the ESA. /d. at 1237. 
90 16 u.s.c. § 1533(d) (2000). 
91 Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 77, at 243. 
92 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
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harm was not facially void for vagueness,93 but was invalid under the ESA 
because it was an unreasonable interpretation of the ESA.94 
In 1995, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed this 
latter holding in a 6-3 majority decision95 authored by Justice Stevens. In this 
decision, the Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,96 the FWS reasonably 
interpreted the ESA when it included significant habitat modification 
resulting in the actual killing or injuring protected wildlife97 in its regulation 
defining "harm," and therefore held that the regulation was not facially 
invalid in violation of the ESA.98 
Because the Supreme Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case only 
addressed a facial challenge to the FWS regulation defining "harm,"99 Justice 
Stevens' majority opinion for the Court in the case did not decide how the 
regulation should be interpreted in all of the various factual circumstances in 
which it might be applied. Justice Stevens explained that the validity of the 
application of the FWS regulation in a particular case will involve. "difficult 
questions of proximity and degree ... [that] must be addressed in the usual 
course of the law, through case-by-case resolution and adjudication."100 
In his majority opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case, 
Justice Stevens held, however, that the taking prohibition of section 
93 Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 3-5 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh 'g denied, 30 
F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
94 /d. at 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 
515 U.S. 687 (1995). This facial challenge was brought by "small landowners, logging 
companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest 
and in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their interests." Sweet Home Chapter, 
515 U.S. at 692. 
95 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 687. Justice O'Connor, who joined Justice Stevens' 
majority opinion along with four other Justices, also filed a concurring opinion. /d. at 708-14 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. /d. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
97 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703,708. 
98 See Liebesman & Davison, supra note 35, for an analysis of Justice Stevens' majority 
opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in 
the Sweet Home Chapter case. 
99 515 U.S. at 692, 699-700. 
100 /d. at 708. 
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9(a)(l)(B) 101 of the ESA prohibits indirect102 and unintended 103 takings of 
protected wildlife as well as direct and willful, 104 deliberate, 105 and purpose-
ful106 takings of protected wildlife. 
In addition, Justice Stevens held in his majority opinion in the Sweet 
Home Chapter case that the FWS regulation defining "harm" is subject to 
"ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability ... [and] 
'but for' causation .... " 107 
Justice Stevens' Sweet Home Chapter opinion also indicates that the 
FWS regulation defining "harm" requires actual killing or injury108 of 
"particular" animals, 109 but his opinion does not explain how "injures" and 
"particular" should be interpreted under the regulation and does not explain 
what type of evidence must be presented to satisfy this requirement that a 
"particular" animal must actually be killed or injured. 110 
In his majority opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case, 
Justice Stevens also held that the taking prohibitions of section 9 of the ESA 
can apply to habitat modification by private landowners 111 and are not limited 
to modification of habitat that has been designated as "critical" under section 
4112 of the ESA113 (as is the case under the second clause of section 7(a)(2) 
of the ESA). 
However, the Court in Sweet Home Chapter held that section 9's 
takings prohibitions do not impose (as does section 7 of the ESA) "a broad 
affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifications .... " 114 and do not 
101 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B) (2000). 
102 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 697-98, 700, 702, 704. 
103 !d. at 701 ("activities not intended to harm an endangered species, such as habitat 
modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the Secretary permits 
them"). 
104 !d. at 697. 
105 /d. at 705 ("the term 'take' in§ 9 reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters 
and trappers."). 
106 /d. at 704. 
107 /d. at700n.13. 
108 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703. 
109 /d. 
110 This requirement, that a "particular" animal be taken, is analyzed infra at notes 164-80 
and accompanying text. 
111 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 706 n.l9 ("Neither statement even suggested that ... 
habitat modification by private landowners stood outside the ambit of§ 9."). 
112 16 u.s.c. § 1533 (2000). 
113 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703. 
114 !d. 
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require (as does section 7(a)(2) of the ESA) an action that is "likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species." 115 In her concurring opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case, 
Justice O'Connor asserted that the FWS regulation defining "harm" "is 
limited to ... habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to 
hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected 
animals,"116 and that "the regulation's application is limited by ordinary 
principles of proximate causation, which introduce notions of fore-
seeability."117 Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion that the 
FWS regulation requires that "individual animals" be actually killed or 
injured,118 while advocating a broad interpretation of "injures" in the FWS 
regulation. The FWS regulation includes physical injury to a particular 
animal within the definition of "injures" under the FWS regulation,119 but 
Justice O'Connor would not limit the term "injures" under the FWS 
regulation to physical injury to a particular animal. Rather, she believes that 
the term "injures" in the FWS regulation also includes significant impairment 
of an animal's breeding that prevents the birth of new offspring of that 
animal.I2o 
Justice O'Connor asserted, however, that the FWS regulation should 
not be interpreted to include speculative harm or only "potential injury,"121 
stating, "that a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree 
or could, perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not sufficient 
under the regulation. Instead, ... the regulation requires demonstrable effect 
(i.e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual members of the protected 
species."122 She asserted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit incorrectly interpreted the law in PaliZa Il123 by holding, 
that a state agency committed a "taking" by permitting 
mouflon sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, when full 
grown, might have fed and sheltered endangered palila . . . 
m /d. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
116 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
117 /d. at 709. 
118 /d. at 709, 711. 
119 /d. at710-11. 
120 /d. at 709-10. 
121 /d. at 711. 
122 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
123 Palila v. Haw. Dept. of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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[because] [ d]estruction of the seedlings did not proximately 
cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely 
prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently 
sustaining actual birds. 124 
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter 
case that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued 
that the FWS regulation defining "harm" was an unreasonable interpretation 
of the ESA 125 and therefore was invalid under the ESA. Justice Scalia also 
argued in his dissenting opinion that the ESA' s takings prohibitions require 
an affirmative act126 that kills or causes physical harm to particular individual 
animals, 127 that is "done directly and intentionally (not indirectly and by 
accident) to particular animals (not populations of animals)."128 
Justice Scalia argued in his dissenting opinion that the FWS 
regulation defining "harm" violates the ESA because of "three features." 129 
First, he argued that the regulation violated the ESA because it is not subject 
to ordinary principles of proximate causation and foreseeability, only re-
quiring that an act be the cause-in-fact of death or injury to wildlife. 130 
Second, he argued that the regulation also violated the ESA because it 
applies to omissions as well as to affirmative acts. 131 Third, Justice Scalia 
argued that the regulation violated the ESA, because it applies to "injuries" 
inflicted upon populations of a protected species 132 such as by impairment of 
breeding and reproduction that prevents an animal from bearing offspring. 133 
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice O'Connor's assertion that 
impairment of an animal's breeding is "harm" under the FWS regulation, 
arguing that "injures" under the FWS regulation requires physical harm to an 
individual, presently-living animal and does not include an injury to a 
population of animals. 134 Justice Scalia further argued in his dissenting 
opinion that when impairment of an animal's breeding occurs, the only 
124 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 713-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
125 /d. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
126 !d. at 715-16. 
127 /d. at 734 n. 5. 
128 /d. at 718. 
129 !d. at 715. 
130 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 715-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
131 !d. at 716. 
132 !d. at 716. 
133 /d. 
134 /d. at 734 n.5. 
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"injury" that occurs is either harm to the unborn potential issue of the animal 
or "psychic harm,"- which he contends are not within the scope of the term 
"injures" in the FWS regulation defining "harm."135 
Justice Scalia would interpret the FWS regulation defining "harm" as 
not making impairment of breeding, feeding, or sheltering of members of a 
protected species of wildlife by itself a form of injury; instead, he considers 
such impairment of an essential behavioral pattern as only "one of the modes 
of 'kill[ing] or injur[ing] wildlife' .''136 
N. INTERPRETATION OF THE FWS REGULATION DEFINING "HARM" 
The requirement in the FWS regulation defining "harm," that an act 
"actually kill or injure" protected wildlife, might be interpreted as applying 
only to an affirmative act that proximately and forseeably causes death or 
injury to a member of a protected species, and as not applying to an omission 
or failure to act (even when the omission proximately and forseeably causes 
death or injury to a protected animal). However, commentary issued by FWS, 
in conjunction with the promulgation of its regulation defining "harm,"137 
states that the word "act" in the regulation should be defined to include both 
commissions (affirmative acts) and omissions. 138 Alternatively, the United 
States, in the Brief for the Petitioner that it filed with the United States 
Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon,139 asserted that a person's omission should be considered to 
be an "act" under the FWS regulation defining "harm" only when the person 
had a "legal duty to act" to prevent death or injury to members of protected 
species. 140 
In addition, the word "actually" in the regulation might be interpreted 
to mean that the regulation only applies when a killing or injury of a 
protected animal actually has occurred in the past or is occurring at the 
present time, and as not applying to a proposed future action that will, or 
probably will, kill or injure a protected animal in the future. 141 However, the 
13S Jd. 
136 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 734 (footnote omitted) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
137 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (Nov. 4, 
1981). 
138 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
139.515 u.s. 687 (1995). 
140 /d. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioner, at 47). 
141 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1063-66 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 
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regulation not only applies to acts that in the past killed or injured protected 
wildlife and to continuing acts that presently are killing or injuring wildlife, 
but, as discussed below, also applies to proposed future actions that probably 
(to a reasonable certainty) will kill or injure protected wildlife in the future. 
When a person ·in the past committed, or currently commits, a 
violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions, the person is subject under the 
ESA both to civil penalties142 and to criminal penalties (that can include 
imprisonment).143 In addition, the ESA authorizes a court to issue an 
injunction against a currently ongoing action that is violating the ESA's 
takings prohibitions, prohibiting the continuation of an ongoing action that 
is violating the ESA's takings prohibitions.144 
Courts also have interpreted the ESA and the FWS regulation 
defining "harm" to authorize federal district courts to issue an injunction to 
halt a proposed future action that is reasonably certain in the future to cause 
imminent "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA.145 A court, 
however, will not enjoin a proposed future action that allegedly will "harm" 
a protected animal in violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions unless there 
is a showing that the proposed future action sought to be enjoined actually 
will kill or injure members of a protected species in the future. 146 An 
injunction can be issued by a court to halt a proposed action that in the future 
probably will cause a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA, without any 
proof that the action caused a prohibited taking in the past or is causing a 
prohibited taking at the present time.147 An injunction cannot be issued under 
the ESA to halt a proposed future action, however, when there is only a 
u.s. 1108 (1997). 
142 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(l) (2000). 
143 /d. § 1540(b)(l). 
144 In both United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998), and 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 
1995), the court issued a preliminary injunction against a local governmental entity that 
prohibited a governmental entity from continuing to permit certain driving of privately-
owned motor vehicles on public beaches, because such driving of motor vehicles was 
causing takings of animals in violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions. 
14
' Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000); Marbled Murre let, 
83 F.3d at 1066; Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784-85 
(9th Cir. 1995); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
1296, 1301-02 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt Agency, 
11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 552 (D. V.I. 1998); Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1180. 
146 Defenders ofWildlife, 204 F.3d at 925; Strahan v. Linnon, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314 
*13 n.6 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998); Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 552. 
147 Marbled Murre let, 83 F.3d at 1064-65; Forest Conservation Council, SO F.3d at 783-84. 
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speculative possibility that the action in the future may kill a member of a 
protected species by modifying habitat of the species. 148 In American Bald 
Eagle v. Bhatti, 149 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
refused to issue an injunction that would in the future halt deer hunting that 
allegedly would result in bald eagles being harmed by eating deer shot by 
hunters and ingesting lead slugs (fired by hunters) in the deer carcasses, 
because the court held that there had been no showing that any bald eagles 
had been harmed by consumption of lead slugs when eating deer carcasses 
shot by hunters who fired the lead slugs. The court stated that "[c]ourts have 
granted injunctive relief[under the ESA's takings prohibitions] only [if] the 
alleged activity has actually harmed the species or ... will actually, as 
opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species."150 The court held in Bhatti 
that a one-in-a million risk of harm to bald eagles from deer hunting was 
insufficient to invoke the protection of the ESA' s takings prohibitions and to 
enjoin future hunting of deer. 151 The First Circuit later explained in another 
case152 that under Bhatti "a risk of harm to endangered species-even a 
significant risk of harm-does not support an injunction under the ESA .. 
. . Rather, we have required a showing that the activity, if continued, will 
actually, as opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species."153 
Under the FWS regulation defining "harm," the modification or 
degradation of the habitat of a protected species of wildlife, by itself, does 
not constitute a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA when the habitat 
modification or degradation does not actually kill or injure protected 
wildlife. 154 In order for habitat modification or degradation to constitute a 
violation of the ESA' staking prohibitions under the FWS regulation defining 
"harm," the habitat modification or degradation must actually kill or injure 
one or more existing animals that are members of a protected listed 
endangered or threatened species.155 
148 American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9F.3d 163, 166-67 n.5 (lstCir. 1993); Strahan, 1998 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 16314, at *13 n.6. 
149 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993). 
ISO fd. at 166. 
tst /d. at 167 n.5. 
1s2 Strahan, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *13. 
1s3 /d. at *13 n.6. 
154 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a.Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,691 n.2, 
705-06 (1995); Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430 (S.D. Ala. 1992). 
tss Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 691 n.2, 696 n.9, 706; Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. 
United States Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1238 {9th Cir. 2001); Defenders of Wildlife 
v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 {9th Cir. 2000); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 
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FWS added the word "actually" before "kills or injures" in its 
regulation defining "harm" in order to emphasize that habitat modification 
alone, without consequent killing or injury of a protected animal, does not 
constitute "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. 156 The 
word "actually" in the FWS regulation defining harm does not require, 
however, that an injury or killing be established to one hundred percent 
certainty or to meet any other burden of proof higher than the traditional civil 
standard of preponderance of the evidence. 157 
Although the ESA's takings prohibitions might be interpreted as 
being violated only when more than one protected animal is harmed, 
(because of the ESA' s takings prohibitions requirement that there be a taking 
of "any ... [endangered] species [of fish or wildlife]" 158 and the FWS "harm" 
regulation's requirement that "wildlife" be "actually killed or injured"), the 
courts have held that a person violates the ESA's takings prohibitions by 
committing an act that proximately and forseeably causes the death or injury 
of even one member of a species of fish or wildlife that is listed as 
endangered or threatened under the ESA. 159 
An act does not have to threaten a species with extinction in order to 
"harm" and "take" members of a protected species in violation of the ESA.160 
However, an act that in the future will cause the extinction of a listed species 
protected by the ESA' s takings prohibitions "harms" members of the species 
and violates the ESA's takings prohibitions. 161 
1065 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997); Forest Conservation Council v. 
Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995). 
156 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (Nov. 4, 1981). 
157 Sean C. Skaggs, Judicial Interpretation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act Before 
and After Sweet Home: More of the Same, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, supra note 21, at 
253, 277-78. 
158 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B),(C) (2000). 
159 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 (1998); 
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R. Inc., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998); Loggerhead Turtle v. County 
Council ofVolusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
160 Nat'/ Wildlife Fed'n, 23 F.3d at 1508; Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1180; Swan 
View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992). 
161 Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), implied in dicta that "harm" would 
occur under the FWS regulation defining "harm" when "an activity, such as draining a pond, 
would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its habitat." !d. at 699-
700. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in that case, argued: 
[t]o raze the last remaining ground on which the piping 
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Furthermore, in a decision issued prior to the Supreme Court's Sweet 
Home Chapter decision, one federal district court162 held that an act of habitat 
modification that prevents the recovery of a protected species is a prohibited 
taking in violation of the ESA. 163 This holding may no longer be valid under 
the Sweet Home Chapter decision, if the holding was based upon a theory 
that habitat modification that retards a species' recovery is "harm" and a 
prohibited "taking" because it injures the species' population, since the Court 
has now interpreted the FWS regulation defining "harm" to require "injury 
to particular animals ... " 164 
In the Sweet Home Chapter case, Justice Stevens, in his majority 
opinion for the Court, held that in order for an act to be found to be a taking 
in violation of the ESA under the FWS regulation defining "harm," the death 
or injury of one or more "particular" animals must be found to have been 
plover currently breeds, thereby making it impossible 
for any piping plovers to reproduce, would obviously 
injure the population (causing the species' extinction in 
a generation). But by completely preventing breeding, 
it would also injure the individual living bird, in the 
same way that sterilizing the creature injures the living 
bird. 
/d. at 709-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural 
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II), the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that habitat destruction that would result in the extinction of a 
protected species of wildlife causes "harm" within the meaning of the FWS regulation 
defining "harm." /d. at 1110. However, Justice 0' Connor asserted in her concurring opinion 
in the Sweet Home Chapter case that this Ninth Circuit decision was wrongfully decided 
under the FWS regulation defining "harm" because no actual death or injury to "identifiable 
birds" was caused, only prevention of "the regeneration of forest land not currently 
sustaining actual birds." 515 U.S. at 714 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit has 
concluded, however, that in the Sweet Home Chapter case five Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court affirmed Palila II "in all respects." Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 80 
F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996). 
162 Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), affd on 
other grounds, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
163 649 F. Supp. at 1077. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on different grounds and 
did not address the issue of whether an act that prevents recovery of a species "harms" 
members of the species. 852 F.2d at 1110-11. 
164 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13. 
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caused by the act. 165 Justice Stevens, however, did not explain how this 
"particular animal" requirement should be interpreted. 
Although Justice Scalia asserted, in his dissenting opinion in the 
Sweet Home Chapter case, 166 that the FWS regulation defining "harm" 
violates the ESA by "encompass[ing] injury inflicted, not only upon 
individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species," Justice 
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in the case, disagreed with Justice 
Scalia's reasoning that "the regulation must contemplate application to a 
population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or increased 
its numbers." 167 Justice O'Connor stated that in her view, "the regulation is 
limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual 
animals." 168 She stated that "[a]t one level, I could not reasonably quarrel 
with [Justice Scalia's] observation [that the regulation encompasses injury 
inflicted upon populations of a protected species]; death to an individual 
animal always reduces the size of the population in which it lives, and in that 
sense, 'injures' that population." 169 However, she the stated that "by its 
insight, the dissent means something else," 170 explaining: 
Building upon the regulation's use of the word "breeding," 
Justice Scalia suggests that the regulation facially bars 
significant habitat modification that actually kills or injures 
hypothetical animals (or, perhaps more aptly, causes potential 
additions to the population not to come into being). Because 
"[i]mpairment of breeding does not 'injure' living creatures," 
165 !d. ("The dissent [of Justice Scalia] incorrectly asserts that the Secretary's ["harm"] 
regulation ... 'fail[s] to require injury to particular animals,' post, at 731."). Justice 
O'Connor, who joined Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Sweet Home Chapter, stated in 
her concurring opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case that "the challenged regulation is 
limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or 
speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals." /d. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). United States v. West Coast Forest Resources Ltd. Partnership, 2000 WL 
298707, *5 (D. Ore. March 13, 2000), held that in order for the United States to obtain a 
permanent injunction against a ninety-four acre timber harvest that allegedly would take two 
spotted owls protected under the ESA, there would have to be evidence of the imminent 
"death or actual injury of an identifiable species. 'Mere speculation' is not sufficient. ... " 
166 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
167 /d. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting Justice Scalia's dissent, id. at 716 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)). 
168 !d. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring)~ 
169 /d. 
170 /d. 
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Justice Scalia reasons, the regulation must contemplate 
application to "a population of animals which would 
otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers." 171 
563 
Justice O'Connor stated that she disagreed with Justice Scalia172 
because she did "not read the regulation's 'breeding' reference ... to suggest 
that the regulation contemplates extension to nonexistent animals." 173 She 
also concluded that significant impairment of breeding of a living animal 
does injure that living anima1. 174 
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter 
case does not explicitly discuss this issue of whether the FWS regulation 
defining "harm" encompasses "injury to a population" of protected animals. 
However, Justice Stevens stated that he disagreed with Justice Scalia's 
assertion that the FWS regulation defining "harm" does not require injury to 
"particular animals," 175 implicitly rejecting Justice Scalia's assertion that the 
regulation encompasses "injury" to a "population" of animals. 
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter 
case also does not address explicitly two issues. The first unanswered 
question is whether the ESA's takings prohibitions and the FWS regulation 
defining "harm" protect a presently-existing unborn fetus that is not born 
alive because of habitat modification. The other unaddressed issue is whether 
the same laws protect a so-called "hypothetical" animal that is not presently 
living (which was not conceived and born in the future because habitat 
modification impaired the breeding of living animals). 
Neither the ESA's takings prohibitions nor the FWS regulation de-
fining "harm" indicate whether an animal fetus that has not been born alive 
and is not presently living can be "taken" in violation of the ESA. For 
instance, are the ESA's takings prohibitions violated when habitat 
modification destroys an unhatched bird or mammal egg prior to the live 
birth of the fetus within the egg, or when a pregnant female animal suffers 
a miscarriage or gives birth to a stillborn fetus? In other words, is an unborn 
fetus a "species" and "wildlife" that is protected under the takings 
171 /d. 
172 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
173 /d. at 710. 
174 /d. at 709-10. Justice O'Connor's position, that significant impairment of breeding of a 
living animal "harms" that animal within the meaning of the FWS regulation defining 
"harm," is discussed infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. 
175 /d. at 700 n.13. 
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prohibitions of the ESA and the FWS regulation defining "harm"? This 
question presents an issue similar to that involved in litigation involving the 
constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting the abortion of an unborn human 
fetus. The United States Supreme Court held, in Roe v. Wade, 176 that an 
unborn human fetus is not a "person" protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court 
is unlikely to interpret the ESA and the FWS regulation defining "harm" as 
affording animal fetuses greater protection than the United States 
Constitution affords to human fetuses, the FWS regulation defining "harm" 
should be interpreted as not protecting fetuses that are not born alive, and as 
protecting only "particular" or "individual" existing animals that have been 
born alive. 
However, neither the ESA's takings prohibitions nor the FWS 
regulation defining "harm" indicate whether the ESA's takings prohibitions 
protect animals not presently living, that are not conceived and born because 
of habitat modification that impairs breeding by presently-living animals. 
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case, 
argued that the definition of "injures" under the FWS regulation defining 
"harm" protects animals that are not presently living but which are not 
conceived or not born as a result of impairment of breeding by living 
creatures. 177 Justice O'Connor, however, stated that "the regulation requires 
demonstrable effect (i.e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual 
members of the protected species," 178 and that she does " ... not read the 
regulation's 'breeding' reference ... to suggest that the regulation 
contemplates extension to nonexistent animals." 179 Justice O'Connor, 
therefore would not interpret the FWS regulation defining "harm" to 
encompass "injury" to "hypothetical" animals that might have been 
conceived and born in the future if habitat modification had not significantly 
impaired the breeding of particular presently-living animals. But the majority 
opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case does not explicitly address this issue 
of whether the ESA's takings prohibitions protect so-called "hypothetical" 
animals who are not conceived or born because of the impairment of the 
breeding by presently living animals. 
176 410 u.s. 113, 158 (1973). 
177 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
178 /d. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
179 /d. at 710. 
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Such "hypothetical" animals have not been born and cannot be 
identified, and therefore probably cannot be considered "particular" animals 
within the meaning of Justice Stevens' majority opinion for the Court in the 
Sweet Home Chapter case. Consequently, the FWS regulation defining 
"harm" should not be interpreted as protecting such "hypothetical" unborn 
animals. 
Another issue not addressed by any of the Justices of the Supreme 
Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case is what type of evidence is required 
to show that a "particular" or "identifiable" living animal(s) has been killed 
or injured and therefore taken in violation of the ESA. There are several 
different types of evidence that may be sufficient to establish that a 
"particular" or "identifiable" animal has been killed or injured and taken in 
violation of the ESA. In some cases, where a protected animal has already 
been killed by an act of a person, the prohibited taking may be proven by 
admission of the body of the dead animal (or of a film or video of the body) 
or by testimony of a witness who observed the animal's dead body after it 
was illegally taken. 
In a case involving allegations that a proposed future activity will 
modify wildlife "habitat" within a particular area of land and will "harm" and 
"take" one or more animals protected by the ESA, proof of a violation of the 
ESA' s takings prohibitions should be able to be established by the admission 
of evidence that establishes ( 1) that one or more members of a protected 
species of wildlife presently are using the particular area for essential 
behavioral purposes (e.g. breeding, feeding or sheltering, thus establishing 
that the area is "habitat" for one or more protected animals) and (2) that the 
proposed future modification ofthis habitat actually will kill or injure one or 
more of these animals who presently are using this area as habitat. 
In such a case, a court should not require either evidence of the 
precise number of members of the species using the area as habitat, or 
evidence establishing the physical markings or characteristics of each 
member of the species using the area as habitat. Furthermore, a court in this 
situation should not require evidence that establishes the identity of the 
particular animal(s) that actually will be killed or injured in the future as a 
proximate result of the habitat modification. Instead, the requirement that 
there be actual death or injury of "particular" or "identifiable" living animals 
should be considered to be satisfied by evidence that shows that one or more 
protected animals presently are using a particular area as "habitat" and that 
future modification ofthat habitat is reasonably certain (more likely than not) 
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to cause the death or injury of one or more of these protected animals that 
presently are using the area as habitat. 180 
The second sentence of the FWS regulation defining "harm," in 
addition, to requiring that habitat modification or degradation "actually kill 
or injure wildlife," also requires that the habitat modification or degradation 
be "significant" and that the habitat modification or degradation kill or injure 
wildlife "by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 181 Yet the FWS regulation defining "harm" 
provides no definition of either "significant" or "significantly impairing" for 
the purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm" and does not provide 
any criteria for determining if habitat modification or degradation is 
"significant" or if essential behavioral patterns have been "significantly" 
impaired. 
By defining "harm" to include only "significant" habitat modification 
or degradation where it actually kills or injures protected wildlife, the FWS 
regulation defining "harm" implies that habitat modification or degradation 
that actually kills or injures protected wildlife nevertheless could be found 
not to be "significant" and therefore found not to be "harm" and a prohibited 
taking in violation of the ESA. The wording of the regulation also might be 
interpreted to require that the "significant" habitat modification or 
degradation both (1) proximately cause "significant" impairment of a 
species' essential behavioral patterns and (2) proximately cause the actual 
killing or injury of one or more animals that are members of a species of 
wildlife protected by the ESA by significantly impairing such essential 
180 See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1108 (1997) (Evidence that endangered marbled murrelet birds had been detected 
approximately one hundred times in a particular ninety-four acre forested area over a recent 
three-year period throughout the birds' breeding periods, with many of the instances of 
detection indicating that marbled murrelet birds were nesting in the area, as well as witness 
testimony that proposed modification of this marbled murrelet habitat by future timber 
harvesting "would likely harm marbled murrelets by impairing their breeding and increasing 
the likelihood of attack by predators on the adult murrelets as well as the young," id. at 1067-
68, resulted in the Ninth Circuit affirming the District Court's injunction against the future 
harvesting of timber in this marbled murrelet habitat because this activity was reasonably 
certain to cause "harm" in the future to protected marbled murrelet birds. Neither the district 
court nor the Ninth Circuit required specific physical identification of the either the birds that 
presently used the area as habitat or the birds that probably would be killed or injured if the 
area was logged in the future.). 
181 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002). 
2003] AFTERMATH OF SWEET HOME CHAPTER 567 
behavioral patterns. 182 Under such an interpretation, the FWS regulation 
defining "harm" would not apply to "significant" habitat modification or 
degradation that does not "significantly" impair essential behavioral patterns, 
even if the significant habitat modification or degradation actually is the 
proximate cause of the killing or injury of an animal protected by the ESA' s 
takings prohibitions. 
In order to further the purposes of the ESA, the FWS regulation 
defining "harm" should be interpreted to include, within the definition of 
"harm," any act that actually kills or injures a protected endangered or 
threatened animal as a proximate result of any habitat modification or 
degradation that impairs any essential behavioral pattern of the protected 
animal. In other words, any habitat modification or degradation that 
proximately causes actual death or injury to a protected animal should be 
considered to be "significant" for purposes of the FWS regulation defining 
"harm," and impairment of a protected animal's breeding, feeding, sheltering 
or other essential behavioral pattern that actually kills or injures a protected 
animal should be considered to be "significant impairment" of an essential 
behavioral pattern of the animal. The FWS regulation should be interpreted 
in this manner because such an interpretation provides greater protection to 
listed endangered and threatened species of wildlife than other interpretations 
of the regulation and is the interpretation of the regulation that best furthers 
Congress' intent "that '[t]ake' [be] defined ... in the broadest possible 
manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or 
attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."183 
If habitat modification or degradation that "actually kills or injures 
wildlife" is not considered to be "harm" for purposes of the FWS regulation 
defining harm, (because it either is not considered to be "significant" or is 
considered not to have caused significant impairment of an essential 
behavioral pattern of a protected animal) the habitat modification or 
alteration might be considered to be "harm" under the first sentence of the 
182 As discussed infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text, the FWS regulation defining 
"harm" should be interpreted to require significant habitat modification that both (1) 
significantly impairs an essential behavioral pattern of one or more protected animals and (2) 
actually kills or injures these animals. Under this interpretation, significant impairment of 
an animal's breeding, feeding, or sheltering by itself does not constitute "injury" and "harm" 
to a protected animal under the regulation. Infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
183 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 
(1995), quoting S. REP. 93-307, at 7 (1973). 
568 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 27:541 
FWS regulation, as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife." 184 In 
order for such an interpretation to be valid, the word "includes'' in the second 
sentence of the regulation defining "harm" would have to be interpreted to 
mean that the inclusion of habitat modification and alteration in the secorid 
sentence of the regulation is not the exclusive means by which habitat 
modification or alteration can be found to be "harm" under the regulation. 
The explicit inclusion of habitat modification and alteration in the second 
sentence of the regulation defining "harm" should be interpreted, however, 
as implying the FWS' intent to define habitat modification or alteration as 
"harm" only if the habitat modification or alteration satisfies the criteria of 
the second sentence of the regulation. 
Under the wording of the second sentence of the FWS regulation 
defining "harm," an act that significantly modifies or alters the habitat of 
members of a listed endangered or threatened species of wildlife does not 
have to take place within the "habitat" of the protected animal that is killed 
or injured by the habitat modification or alteration. The second sentence of 
the FWS regulation only"requires that the act must significantly modify or 
degrade habitat of a protected animal and proximately and forseeably cause 
the killing or injury of one or more of these protected animals 185 by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns. The regulation does not 
require that the act take place within the geographical boundaries of the 
"habitat"186 of the animal(s) allegedly taken in violation of the ESA. The 
second sentence of the FWS regulation defining "harm" is not worded in a 
manner that requires that significant habitat modification or degradation be 
caused by an act taking place within or on the "habitat" that is modified or 
degraded; the regulation only requires that an act significantly modify or 
degrade wildlife habitat and actually kill or injure protected wildlife by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns. An act occurring outside 
the geographical boundaries of an animal's "habitat" therefore can be a 
prohibited taking of a protected animal in violation of the ESA if the act 
proximately and forseeably causes significant modification or degradation 
of the habitat of the animal, significant impairment of essential behavioral 
patterns of the animal and the killing or injury of the animal. An example of 
such an act would be detonation of explosives on land adjacent to habitat of 
184 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002). 
185 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 687, 700 n.l3 (1995). 
186 The definition of "habitat" of a protected animal, for purposes of the FWS regulation 
defining "harm," is discussed infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text. 
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a protected species that proximately and forseeably causes the nest of a 
protected bird to fall to the ground, causing the death of recently hatched 
offspring of the bird. Another example would be the run-off of toxic 
pollutants from a development site into nearby waters that are the habitat of 
protected fish, causing the death of the fish. 187 
A. Definition of "Habitat" 
When a taking of a protected animal in violation of the ESA is 
alleged to have been caused by modification or degradation of the animal's 
habitat, the "habitat" of the animal has to be defined geographically, and the 
act that allegedly is a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA must be 
proven to be the proximate and foreseeable cause of significant modification 
or degradation of that habitat. 188 
"Habitat" has to be established individually for each animal that 
allegedly has been taken in violation of the ESA by significant habitat 
modification or degradation. However, the FWS regulation defining "harm" 
does not define a protected animal's "habitat," and the courts have not 
adopted a general definition of "habitat" for purposes of the regulation. 
Should a person commit an act that proximately and forseeably 
causes the death or injury of a protected animal by modifying or degrading 
land or an ecosystem that is not shown to have actually been the "habitat" of 
the animal at the time of the animal's death or injury, the act of the person 
nevertheless could be found to be "harm" under the first sentence of the FWS 
regulation defining "harm" because the person did an act that actually killed 
187 See generally Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992), and Hawksbill Sea 
Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D. V.I. 1998) (addressing 
claims that alleged that takings of protected animals in violation of the ESA would be 
proximately caused by modification of habitat of wildlife protected by the ESA, both by acts 
that would take place within the geographical boundaries of the animals' habitat and by acts 
that would take place outside the geographical boundaries of the habitat). In these two cases, 
the courts rejected all of the takings claims on the grounds that there had been no showing 
that any of the acts (either those occurring within the "habitat" or those outside the "habitat") 
would proximately cause any killing or injury to any protected wildlife. Neither of these two 
decisions, however, explicitly addressed the issue of whether "harm" under the regulation 
can be caused by an act that occurs outside an animal's "habitat." 
188 See generally Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 687,697 n.9, 700 n.13; Morrill v. Lujan, 
802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992); United States v. West Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, 
2000 WL 298707 (D. Ore. 2000). 
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or injured a protected animal. Although the person would not have 
committed an act that significantly modified or degraded "habitat" of the 
animal that was killed or injured (within the meaning of the second sentence 
of the FWS regulation defining "harm"), the person's act of modifying land 
or an ecosystem would constitute "harm" under the first sentence of the 
regulation if the act was the proximate and foreseeable cause of the killing 
or injury of a protected animal-and the person therefore would be liable for 
a prohibited taking of the animal in violation of the ESA. 
Under the FWS regulation defining "harm," the "habitat" of a 
particular animal should be defined as the geographical area where the 
animal engages in "essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, 
or sheltering."189 In other words, a particular animal's "habitat" for purposes 
of the FWS regulation defining "harm" is the animal's range190-the 
geographical area where the animal presently goes and probably will go in 
the future to obtain food (either for itself or its mate or offspring}, to 
conceive, bear or raise its young, or to obtain shelter for sleep, rest or 
protection from predators or natural forces (weather) for itself or for its mate 
or offspring- on a regular or frequent basis, rather than on a one-time basis. 
Under this approach, modification or degradation of land that 
presently is not being used by a protected animal for essential behavioral 
patterns (breeding, feeding or sheltering) and that probably (more likely than 
not) will not be used in .the future by the animal for .such purposes, is not 
"habitat" for the animal for purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm." 
Modification or degradation of land that is not inhabited by a protected 
animal cannot be "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA, 
even if the land is suitable for breeding, feeding or sheltering by the animal 
or members of its species.191 
The habitat of a particular animal protected by the ESA, that is a 
member of a specific pack, flock or family of those animals, may be different 
from the habitat of other animals that are members of the same species who 
are members of a different pack, flock or family, because the particular range 
of that animal may differ from the range of other members of its species. 
189 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002). 
190 Robert J. Taylor, Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT. 
REsOURCES & ENV'T 6, 8-9 (1993) (discussing the range and habitat of a number of different 
migratory species of wildlife). 
191 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713-14 
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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Animals in different packs, flocks or families may well use different 
geographical areas to obtain food or prey or shelter for themselves, their 
mates, or their offspring, and thus may have different "habitats" for purposes 
of the FWS regulation defining "harm." 
Of course, when particular land or an ecosystem that serves as the 
habitat for a number of animals of the same protected species is modified or 
degraded by a particular act, each and every one of these protected animals 
may be the victim of a taking prohibited by the ESA if each animal is 
actually either killed or injured by the act within the meaning of the FWS 
regulation defining "harm." Where the habitat of a number of animals in a 
pack, flock, or family is significantly modified or degraded, each member of 
the pack, flock, or family must be actually killed or injured by the habitat 
modification or degradation in order for each member of the pack, flock, or 
family to be the victim of a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. 
A court should permit both direct and circumstantial evidence to be 
introduced to be used to establish that particular land or a particular 
ecosystem is the "habitat" of a particular animal, for purposes of the FWS 
regulation defining "harm" and the ESA's takings prohibitions. The best 
direct evidence in support of a claim that a particular geographical area is the 
habitat of a particular animal would be the testimony of a person (especially 
a trained biologist) who firsthand visually· observed, heard or otherwise 
detected that animal engaged in conduct or behavior in that area that is 
associated with breeding, feeding, sheltering or other essential behavioral 
patterns. Examples of such firsthand observations of essential behavior in a 
particular area would be observation (firsthand or by means of a camera, film 
or video) of a particular animal engaged in obtaining food in the area, 
sheltering in a nest, den or burrow in the area, acts of reproduction, or 
bearing or caring for offspring in that area. 192 Of course, one time observation 
of a particular animal in a particular geographical area probably is not 
sufficient to establish that the area is the "habitat" of the animal, because the 
animal's presence in the area that one time may be the result of many 
different things. For instance, that animal may only be fleeing through that 
area to escape a predator or natural forces (such as a wildfire) or traveling 
through that area while seeking new habitat to use for breeding, feeding or 
192 See generally Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995), a.ffd, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) 
(determining that protected birds were using a particular area for shelter, based on a trained 
observor hearing distinctive bird calls and sounds associated with sheltering). 
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sheltering. On the other hand, if a particular animal is observed physically 
present in a particular area a number of times over a substantial period of 
time, the repeated presence of the animal in that area over a substantial 
period of time should be circumstantial evidence that the animal is using that 
area for feeding, breeding, or sheltering and that the area is part of the 
"habitat" of that animal. 
A particular geographical area also should be found to be the habitat 
of one or more members of a specific protected species if one or more 
members of the protected species are observed visually or by hearing 
engaged in conduct associated with use of the area for breeding, feeding or 
sheltering, without the need to physically identify, by distinctive markings 
or features, the specific animals who are using the area for breeding, feeding, 
or sheltering. 193 
In some cases, the movements of a particular protected animal, that 
allegedly is the victim of a taking in violation of the ESA, can be tracked by 
radiotelemetry because the animal already has a transmitting device attached 
to it. In such a case, the radiotelemetry data, along with physical inspection 
of the areas where the radiotelemetry data indicate the animal has been (to 
look for evidence of feeding, breeding or sheltering by that animal), can 
provide data establishing that the animal is using a particular area for 
essential behavioral purposes and establish that the area is "habitat" for the 
particular animal. 194 Of course, caution should be exercised before attaching 
a radiotelemetry device to a particular protected animal solely for the 
purposes of determining the animal's "habitat" and whether the animal is the 
victim of a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. 
Circumstantial evidence that should be sufficient to establish that a 
particular geographical area is the habitat of one or more animals that are 
members of a protected species would include evidence that prey of that 
species was recently killed or devoured in that area by a member of the 
protected species. The recent killing of prey in that area by a member of the 
193 See generally id. As discussed supra notes 164-80 and infra notes 220-22 and 
accompanying text, one or more animals should be able to be found to be the victim of a 
prohibited taking in violation of the ESA without the animal being identified by specific 
distinctive markings or features. 
194 See United States v. West Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, 2000 WL 298707 (D. Ore. 2000) 
(requiring the United States to provide radio telemetry data from two protected owls, and 
data establishing actual use of a particular area by the two owls, in support of the federal 
government's request for a permanent injunction against planned harvesting of timber on the 
ninety-four acre area, that allegedly would "take" the two owls in violation of the ESA). 
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species would establish that the area presently is used by some members of 
the species for feeding and therefore is "habitat" for some members of the 
species. Alternatively, the discovery in the area of a presently-used burrow, 
den, or nest of the type used by members of the protected species also should 
be sufficient circumstantial evidence that the area presently is used for 
sheltering by some members of the protected species and therefore is 
"habitat" of some members of that species. Such circumstantial evidence 
would be even stronger if members of the protected species were detected 
(possibly by recent stool from a member of the species) either within the area 
or in the vicinity of the area where feeding or sheltering by members of the 
species appears to be occurring at the present time, particularly if some 
members of the species recently were observed coming from the direction of 
that area. 
Even when a presently-used shelter or nest of members of a particular 
protected species is not found within a particular area, circumstantial 
evidence that members of the species are sheltering (nesting) in that area 
exists when that area contains the type of flora that is used by members of 
that species for shelter (nests) and there also is visual or auditory detection 
of the presence in that area of members of the species engaged in behavior 
that biologists associate with use of the area by members of the species for 
sheltering (nesting). 195 
Of course, in order for "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of 
the ESA to occur, there also has to be an act significantly modifying or 
degrading the "habitat" which actually "kills" or "injures" a member of the 
protected species by significantly impairing an essential behavioral pattern 
of a member of the species. 
B. Interpretation of "Kills" and "Injures" 
Under the FWS regulation defining "harm," a taking of a protected 
animal in violation of the ESA can occur if an act "actually" injures a 
protected animal, without the animal being killed. The regulation, however, 
195 See Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1352-1360 (N.D. Cal. 
1995), affd sub nom. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (holding that visual and auditory detection, coupled with actual 
observations of "occupied behavior," of protected marbled murrelets in certain parts of a 
forested area, which biologists associated with marbled murrelets using the area for nesting 
(sheltering), was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the court that members of the 
protected marbled murrelet species were using the forested area for nesting (sheltering).). 
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neither defines "injures" nor provides any criteria for defining "injures." 
Furthermore, Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the Court in Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 196 did not discuss how 
"injures" ·should be defined for purposes of the FWS regulation defining 
"harm." 
"Injures" under the regulation should be defined broadly and should 
not be limited only to a serious or permanent physical injury, wound, or 
disease. "Injures" certainly should not be limited to a physical injury, wound, 
or disease to a particular animal that makes the death of the animal imminent 
and probable (reasonably certain to occur, under the more likely than not 
preponderance of evidence civil burden of proof) in the near future, because 
an act that is reasonably certain to cause the i~nent death of a protected 
animal in the future would be considered to "actually kill" the protected 
animal within the meaning of the FWS regulation defining "harm."197 
At the present time, however, two opposing interpretations of 
"injures" under the FWS regulation defining "harm" have been asserted by 
some of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, 
in her concurring opinion in Sweet Home Chapter, 198 indicates that in her 
view a presently-living animal is "injured" not only when it is physically 
harmed or injured, 199 but also when its breeding is significantly impaired by 
destruction of its habitat. 200 She also reasoned that habitat degradation which, 
... completely prevent[s] breeding ... would ... injure the 
individual living bird in the same way that sterilizing the 
creature injures the individual living bird. To "injure" is, 
among other things, "to impair" .... [O]ne need not subscribe 
to theories of 'psychic harm," cf. post [Justice Scalia's 
dissent], at 734-735, n. 5, to recognize that to make it 
impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most 
essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its 
196 515 u.s. 687 (1995). 
197 Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108 
(1997). 
198 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 709-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
199 /d. at 710 ("The regulation has clear application ... to significant habitat modification that 
kills or physically injures animals .... "). 
200 /d. ("In any event, even if impairing an animal's ability to breed were not, in and of itself, 
an injury to that animal, interference with breeding can cause an animal to suffer other, 
perhaps more obvious, kinds of injury."). 
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· genetiC-material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is 
actual injury.2°1 
575 
Under this interpretation of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in the 
Sweet Home Chapter case, a protected animal is "injured" and "harmed" 
· when a modification of its habitat significantly impairs the animal's essential 
behavioral patterns (such as breeding, feeding, or sheltering),202 without the 
need for any attendant physical injury, wound or disease also to be caused by 
the habitat modification. 
The opposing theory, espoused by Justice Scalia in his dissenting 
opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case, would interpret "injures" in the 
FWS regulation to mean only physical injurf03 or physical harm.204 Justice 
Scalia, however, did not explain whether he would define "physical injury 
or harm" to include a disease as well as a physical injury (such as a wound 
or broken limb), or whether he would require a "physical injury or harm" to 
be "serious or significant" or permanent, or both. However, under Justice 
Scalia's definition of "injures," impairment of breeding, feeding or sheltering 
is only " ... one of the modes of 'kill[ing] or injur[ing] wildlife,"'205 but such 
impairment of an essential behavioral pattern is not itself an "injury."206 
Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals and district courts also 
have divided on the issue of how "injures" should be defined for purposes of 
the FWS regulation defining "harm," with some judges207 following the 
theory that "injures" includes significant impairment of an animal's breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering (as well as physical harm or injury), and other judges208 
201 /d. This discussion, and her later statement that she does not "read the regulation's 
'breeding' reference to vitiate or somehow to qualify the clear actual death or injury 
requirement~ .. ," id., might be interpreted to mean that Justice O'Connor requires habitat 
modification not only to significantly impair an animal's breeding, but also to "injure" the 
animal, such as by completely and permanently preventing breeding by the animal. Under 
this interpretation, significant impairment of an animal's breeding by itself would not 
"injure" the animal. 
202 MarbledMurrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067; Forest Conservation Council v. RosboroLumberCo., 
50 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1995). 
203 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
204 /d. at 734 n.5. 
205 /d. at 734. 
206 /d. at 734 n.5. 
207 Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067; Forest Conservation Council, 50 F.3d at 788. 
208 Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 553, 554 
(D. V.I. 1998); Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923,939 (D. Mont. 1992). 
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following Justice Scalia's position that significant impairment of an essential 
behavioral pattern by itself is not sufficient to constitute "injury" to an 
animal under the regulation. 
Different portions of the FWS commentary accompanying its 
regulation defining "harm" support both of these two opposing 
interpretations of "injures." One portion of the commentary, which states 
that "[h]abitat modification as injury would only be covered by the new 
definition if it significantly impaired essential behavioral patterns of a listed 
species,"209 could be interpreted to mean that significant impairment of an 
essential behavioral pattern by itself is an "injury." However, another portion 
of the FWS commentary indicates that significant impairment of an essential 
behavioral pattern by itself is not an "injury," stating that under the FWS 
regulation defining "harm," habitat modification "must be significant, must 
significantly impair essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual 
injury to a protected wildlife species."210 Another portion of the FWS 
commentary also implies that significant impairment of an essential 
behavioral pattern by itself is not an "injury," by stating that "[t]he word 
'impair' was substituted for 'disrupt' to limit harm to situations where a 
behavioral pattern was adversely affected and not simply disturbed on a 
temporary basis with no consequent injury to the protected specie~."211 The 
following commentary, that accompanied the FWS' s 1981 proposal to amend 
its 1975 regulation defining "harm," also indicates that "injures" should not 
be interpreted to include significant impairment of an essential behavioral 
pattern by itself: 
This [1975] definition [of "harm"] contains a significant 
ambiguity. If the words "such effects" are read to refer to the 
phrase "significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns," 
then any significant environmental modification or 
degradation that disrupts essential behavioral patterns will fall 
under the definition of harm, regardless of whether an actual 
killing or injuring of a listed species of wildlife is 
demonstrated .... In an opinion dated April 17, 1981, the 
Solicitor's Office concluded that such a result is inconsistent 
with the intent of Congress.212 
209 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (Nov. 4, 1981). 
210 /d. at 750. 
211 /d. 
212 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (June 2, 1981). 
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While the FWS 's commentary accompanying its promulgation of its 
regulation defining "harm" indicates that significant impairment of an 
essential behavioral pattern by itself should not be considered an "injury," 
neither the FWS regulation defining "harm" nor its commentary 
accompanying the regulation indicate how "injures" should be defined under 
the regulation. 
A broad definition of "injures," that is not limited to physical injuries 
or harm and expansively protects wildlife from other adverse effects 
proximately caused by modifications of habitat, should be adopted for 
purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm," because Congress intended 
that the ESA' s takings prohibitions should be defined in "the broadest 
possible manner,"213 and because a broad definition of"injures" is consistent 
with dictionary definitions of "injures" quoted by several Supreme Court 
Justices in the Sweet Home Chapter case.214 
The word "injures" should not be interpreted, for purposes of the 
FWS regulation defining "harm," to mean only a serious and permanent 
physical wound, injury or disease to an identifiable, particular animal. 
Rather, a protected animal should be considered to be "injured," "harmed," 
and "taken" in violation of the ESA if it suffers a permanent and serious (but 
non-life threatening)215 physical wound, injury or disease as a result of 
habitat modification that significantly impairs the animal's breeding, feeding, 
or sheltering. 
In addition, even a temporary physical wound, injury or disease 
should be considered to be an "injury" under the regulation, because in 
unfortunate circumstances such a physical wound, injury or disease may lead 
to the premature death of the harmed animal because the wound, injury, or 
213 Babbitt v. SweetHomeChapterofCommunities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,704 (1995) 
(quoting S. REP. No. 93-307 at 7). 
214 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in the case, states that "[t]o 'injure' is, among 
other things, 'to impair."' 515 U.S. at 710 (O'Connor, J., concurring), citing WEBSTER's 
NINTH NEW COUEGIATE DICfiONARY 623 (1983). Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion 
in the case, quoted the following broad dictionary commentary with respect to the word 
"injures": "Injure has the widest range ... Harm and hurt refer principally to what causes 
physical or mental distress to living things." /d. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoting from 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICfiONARY 662 (1985). 
21 s As discussed supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text, an act that probably will result 
in -the imrriinent death of an animal in the near future would be an act that "actually kills" the 
animal (rather than just an act that only "actually injures" the animal), within the meaning 
of the FWS regulation defining harm. 
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disease makes the animal more susceptible to further injury or to death from 
the natural elements, predators, or other animals with which the harmed 
animal may compete for food, mates, or shelter. An example of such an 
injury would be a new-born bird suffering a broken leg or wing when a tree 
in which its nest (shelter) is located is felled during timber harvesting. This 
is true even if the broken leg or wing eventUally heals completely so that the 
animal does not die as a result. In addition, temporary loss of an animal's 
body weight, caused by habitat modification which adversely affects the 
animal's food supply and behavioral feeding patterns, should be considered 
to be an "injury" under the FWS regulation defining "harm." Even such a 
temporary loss of body weight may make: the animal more vulnerable to 
predators and disease by reducing the animal's strength and stamina. The 
animal should be considered to be "injured" in such a situation even though 
the animal later finds an alternate, adequate food supply and regains its 
normal body weight. 216 Furthermore, an animal should be considered to be 
"injured" if modification of its habitat causes the animal to fail to conceive 
or bear offspring during a particular breeding season by impairing the 
animal's normal breeding behavior, thus preventing a female animal from 
conceiving new offspringl17 or causing a pregnant female animal to miscarry 
or to have a stillborn birth. An "injury" and "harm" should be considered to 
have occurred under the ESA in these cases, even though the animal may be 
able to successfully breed and reproduce offspring in future breeding 
seasons, because the animal's lack of successful breeding and reproduction 
in even one breeding season is contrary to the ESA's goal of achieving 
recovery of listed species of wildlife. 218 
On the other hand, a protected animal should not be considered to be 
"injured" simply because its breeding, feeding or sheltering is significantly 
216 See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554 (D. 
V .1. 1998) (Mere destruction of animals that are a food source of a protected animal by itself 
is not an "injury" and "harm" to the protected animal, because the animal may have other 
sources of that type of food or may have access to other types of food.). 
217 See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1271-72 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 
1991) (holding that endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers were harmed by timber 
management practices that isolated colonies of the birds within national forests in Texas, 
preventing the birds from locating breeding partners). 
218 In her concurring opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case, Justice O'Connor stated that 
an animal is "injured" when environmental pollutants degrade the animal's habitat and cause 
the animal''to suffer physical complications during gestation." 515 U.S. at 710 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). 
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impaired. In such a situation, the· animal may.·be able to adapt to this 
impairment of its essential behavioral patterns without being killed and 
without suffering .any significant adverse. effects. For. example, when a 
protected animal's food supply within a habitat is destroyed or reduced, the 
animal may be able to find sufficient adequate food for its own needs (thus 
maintaining its health and normal body weight) and the heeds of its offspring 
and mate. In such a situation, the animal should· not be considered to be 
injured even though one of its essential behavioral patterns (its feeding) has 
been significantly impaired.219 Another example of significant impairment 
of an essential behavioral pattern that does not "injure" a protected animal 
would be where habitat modification temporarily prevents. a protected 
animal's attempt to mate and conceive new offspring at a particular time 
(such as by causing the animal's prospective mate temporarily to leave a 
particular area before mating occurs), when the animal and its prospective 
mate successfully mate later during the same breeding season and conceive 
and bear new offspring after the unsuccessful initial attempt. Yet another 
example of significant impairment of an essential behavioral pattern that 
does not "injure" a protected animal would be a situation where a protected 
animal's shelter (nest) is destroyed by habitat modification but the animal is 
able to establish a new adequate shelter without suffering any adverse effects 
(even if the new shelter has to be located outside the animal's present habitat 
and range). 
As these examples illustrate, for the purposes of the FWS regulation 
defining "harm," a particular animal should not be considered to be "injured" 
simply because the animal's breeding, feeding, or sheltering has been 
significantly impaired by modification of the animal's habitat. Rather, in 
order for a particular animal to be considered to be "injured" by habitat 
modification, the habitat modification must adversely affect the animal in 
some significant way by significantly impairing the animal's breeding, 
feeding or sheltering. A significant adverse affect that should be considered 
to be an "injury" to a protected animal, however, should include prevention 
of conception or birth of new offspring by a particular animal during a 
particular breeding season, as well as any adverse impact upon a particular 
219 See Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (implying that protected animals are not 
"injured" (for purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm") when the animals' food 
supply in a particular habitat is destroyed, and the destroyed food supply has not been shown 
to be the animals' only available food supply, because the protected animals "might be able 
to seek food somewhere else .... "). 
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animal's feeding, or sheltering that makes the animal more susceptible to 
death or to a physical injury, wound, or disease from other animals (including 
predators) or natural forces. An "injury" under the FWS regulation defining 
"harm" should not have to be a life-threatening or permanent physical injury, 
wound or disease. 
In addition to deciding what types of adverse impacts should be 
included within the definition of "injures" for purposes of the FWS 
regulation defining "harm," courts also will have to decide what kinds of 
evidence will be considered sufficient to establish that habitat modification 
has killed or injured particular protected animals. Obviously, the purposes of 
the ESA probably will not be served by an evidentiary rule requiring that a 
particular protected animal be physically examined (possibly after the animal 
is temporarily captured) to determine whether the animal has suffered a 
physical wound, injury or disease as a result of significant impairment of an 
essential behavioral pattern of the animal that was caused by modification of 
the animal's habitat. Even a rule requiring evidence of direct physical 
observations by a trained scientist, or by videotape, film or photographs, of 
an "injury" to a protected animal (such as observations of the animal's 
behavior after the "injury"), may be difficult to satisfy, because many types 
of protected wildlife may be difficult to observe visually in their habitat.220 
Consequently, courts should permit the killing or the "injury" of a 
protected animal, by modification of the animal's habitat, to be established 
by the testimony of an expert scientist giving a learned, expert opinion that 
the modification of the habitat of one or more protected animals significantly 
is impairing or probably will impair the animals' breeding, feeding or 
sheltering and also is causing or probably will cause death or physical injury, 
disease or other significant adverse impacts to one or more of the protected 
animals that use the habitat.221 
220 See generally Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1354 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995), affid sub nom., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996}, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) ("Nearly 75 to 95 percent of all marbled murrelet detections 
in California are audible detections."). 
221 See Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067-68 (This case held that 1) there was sufficient 
expert scientific evidence, collected by trained observers who engaged in detections of 
marbled murrelet birds in the wild according to an accepted scientific protocol, establishing 
that marbled murrelets were using a particular forested area for sheltering and habitat (These 
trained observers made approximately one-hundred visual and auditory detections of marbled 
murrelets in that area "throughout the birds' breeding season, for a period of three 
consecutive years".); and 2) there was sufficient testimony by several expert scientific 
witnesses as "to the probability of the murrelets' nesting in [the area] and that 
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In addition, a court should hold that there is sufficient evidence that 
modification of the habitat of a protected species of wildlife in the past has 
killed one or members of the protected species, when there is evidence that 
the population of that species in that habitat declined after the modification 
of that habitat, without the need to identify specifically the particular animals 
killed by the habitat modification. In these cases there should be an absence 
of any evidence that the decline of the species' population in that modified 
habitat was caused by members of the species being killed by some other 
act(s) or by members of the species migrating to a new habitat.222 
V. PROXIMATE CAUSATION STANDARDS 
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon, 223 a majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court held 
that a prohibited "take" in violation of the ESA can be caused by an indirect 
act as well as by a direct act, 224 and that the FWS regulation defining "harm" 
is subject to "ordinary requirements of proximate causation and 
foreseeability ... [and] 'but for' causation."225 
Because under the general common law of torts there can be two or 
more proximate causes of a particular injury or harm,226 two or more persons 
therefore each can be held to be the proximate, foreseeable and "but for" 
cause of a "take" of a particular animal protected under the takings 
prohibitions of the ESA. Each of these persons can be liable under the ESA 
for the prohibited taking of one particular animal. An example of such a 
situation would be when one person modifies the habitat of a protected 
animal, causing that animal to flee its habitat and to go to another area where 
implementation of [the] harvesting plan would likely harm marbled murrelets by impairing 
their breeding and increasing the likelihood of attack by predators on the adult murrelets as 
well as the young;" and 3) significantly impairing the breeding and sheltering of the 
protected birds by itself amounted to "harm" under the ESA.). 
222 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), a.ff' din part and vacated in part 
on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). The facts 
and holdings of this case are discussed infra note 231 and in Davison, supra note 48, at 192-
95. 
223 515 u.s. 687 (1995). 
224 Jd. at 697-98. 
225 Jd. at 700 n.13. 
226 Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unraveling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U. 
BALT. J. ENV1L. L. 1, 9-10 (1993). 
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the animal is shot and killed by a hunter. In such a case, both the hunter (the 
direct cause of the animal's death) and the person who modified the animal's 
habitat (the indirect cause of the animal's death) commit a taking in violation 
of the ESA, because each of these two persons were the proximate, 
foreseeable, and "but for" cause ofthe particular animal's death.227 Another 
situation, where two different persons each could be liable under the ESA for 
the prohibited taking of one particular animal, is when a private individual 
or corporation engages in an act that requires a permit or license issued by 
the federal, state or local government and that act forseeably and proximately 
causes the death or injury of a particular protected animal in violation of the 
ESA's takings prohibitions. In such a case, both the private individual or 
corporation (as the direct cause of the taking) and the government that issued 
the permit or license (as the indirect cause of the taking) are liable for the 
prohibited taking of the one particular animal.228 
Habitat modification may constitute a prohibited taking in violation 
of the ESA either when the habitat modification directly kills or injures a 
particular protected animal or when the habitat modification indirectly kills 
or injures a protected animal. An example of habitat modification directly 
and proximately killing a protected animal would be when a lumberjack or 
bulldozer fells a tree containing a nest with recently hatched protected birds, 
who are killed when their nest crashes to the ground after the felling of the 
tree. An example of habitat modification indirectly killing members of a 
protected species of wildlife would be when habitat modification destroys the 
species' only available food supplies, resulting in the death of all members 
of the species in that habitat due to starvation.229 
However, killings or injury of protected wildlife in violation of the 
ESA' s takings prohibitions have not necessarily been proximately caused by 
modification of the animals' habitat simply because the population of the 
particular species in that particular habitat is found to have decreased after 
the modification of that habitat has occurred. Some of the decline of the 
species' population within the habitat may be due to deaths of some members 
of the species due to natural causes (such as age, disease or non-human 
227 This example is discussed in Davison, supra note 48, at 190-91. 
228 The liability of the federal, state or local government under the ESA's takings 
prohibitions, for authorizing or permitting a taking by another person by issuance of a permit 
or license or by inadequately regulating the actions of that other person, is discussed infra 
notes 236-52 and accompanying text. 
229 This type of situation is discussed in Davison, supra note 48, at 191-92. 
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predators). On the other hand, such natural deaths of members of the species 
may be offset in whole or in part by the birth ·of new offspring within the 
habitat,. or by. the migration of members of the species into the habitat. 
However, modification of the habitat of the species may reduce the animals' 
shelter and food supply, making them more susceptible to being killed by 
predators.230 Habitat modification also may adversely affect the species' 
breeding and reproduction, proximately causing a decline of the species' 
population because the birth rate fell below the rate of death within the 
habitat. 231 
Because the ESA seeks to increase the p~pulation of listed 
endangered and threatened species of fish and wildlife to levels of recovery 
that permit a listed species to be de-listed, the courts should adopt a rule 
permitting a finding that habitat modification or degradation has proximately 
caused the killings of one or more members of a listed protected species, 
when the species' population within the habitat has declined after the 
modification or degradation of the habitat and there is no other reasonable 
explanation for the decline in the species' population (such as the species' 
migration or abnormally high death rates or low birth rates due to natural 
forces, disease, or predators).232 This rule would not apply, and harm or 
taking in violation of the ESA would not be found, when a species' 
population within a particular habitat either increases or remains the same 
despite the modification or degradation of that habitat.233 However, if there 
is evidence that a specific, identifiable animal was killed or injured by an act 
230 See generally Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish that 
destruction of marbled murrelet bird habitat by timber harvesting would make both adult and 
young murrelets more susceptible to attack by predators). 
231 See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated 
in part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991)(The 
court held that a decline in population of the endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers in the 
national forests in eastern Texas was proximately caused in part by the decline in the birth 
rate of the birds within the national forests that was proximately caused by modification of 
the birds' habitat by timber management actions that interfered with the birds' breeding. The 
court in Lyng also found that the reduction in woodpecker population within the national 
forests was partially caused by a reduction in the birds' food supply and shelter within their 
habitat. These findings were made in the absence of any evidence that part or all of the 
decline in the woodpecker population in the national forests in eastern Texas was due to the 
migration of any woodpeckers to new habitat elsewhere or due to any cause other than the 
habitat modification.). See also Davison, supra note 48, at 192-95. 
232 This proposed rule is discussed in Davison, supra note 48, at 195-97. 
233 Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 77, at 227-29. 
584 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 27:541 
that modified or degraded the animal's habitat, that act would violate the 
ESA's takings prohibitions even though the population of the species 
increased after the act occurred.234 
VI. TAKlNGS BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY AUTHORIZING OR 
INEFFECTIVELY REGULATING A TAKlNG BY ANOTHER PERSON 
A federal, state, or local governmental entity commits a taking in 
violation of the ESA when it issues a permit, license, or other authorization, 
that allows or authorizes a person to engage in a particular act that directly 
causes, or will directly cause in the future, a prohibited taking of a protected 
animal, when that particular act legally could not take place but for the 
governmental permit, license or authorization.235 In such cases, a prohibited 
taking of a particular animal in violation of the ESA is considered to have 
been proximately caused and committed both by the permittee or licensee 
(the person whose governmentally-authorized act directly caused the 
prohibited taking) and by the governmental entity that issued the permit, 
license or authorization.236 Such dual liability is consistent with the holding 
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon237 that 
the FWS definintion of harm requires compliance with "ordinary 
requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability ... [and] 'but for' 
causation" because under the traditional common law of torts there can be 
two or more "but for" and proximate causes of one particular harm238 and 
because it is foreseeable that harm may occur to a protected animal when a 
234 See United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding 
that prohibited takings in violation of the ESA of threatened piper plover birds had been 
proximately caused by the driving of off-road vehicles on public beaches, based upon the 
discovery of the dead bodies of several members of the protected species in tire tracks of off-
road vehicles, even though the population of the species in the area had increased during the 
preceding eight years). 
235 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163-64 (lstCir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 (1998); 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 
1995); United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81,90 (D. Mass. 1998). 
236 Strahan, 127 F.3d at 163. Alternatively, the governmental entity in such a situation may 
be considered to have violated section 9(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2002), of the ESA, by 
causing the commission of a section 9 violation takings prohibitions by issuing the permit, 
license or authorization. Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1996), affd in part 
and vacated in part on other grounds, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
830 (1998). 
237 515 U.S. 687,700 n.13 (1995). 
238 Black & Hollander, supra note 226, at 9-10. 
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governmental entity authorizes or permits another person to engage in an act 
that is reasonably certain to harm a protected animal. 
Under this principle of governmental liability under the ESA's 
takings prohibitions for authorizing an act by another person that takes a 
protected animal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held the Commonwealth of Massachusetts liable under the ESA's takings 
prohibitions for illegal "takings" of protected whales by private persons 
engaged in gillnet and lobster pot fishing in Massachusetts coastal waters, 
when such specific acts of fishing were authorized by permits issued by the 
Commonwealth and would be illegal under Massachusetts law without such 
state permits.239 In support of this holding, the First Circuit reasoned that, 
[t]he causation ... while indirect, is not so removed that it 
extends outside the realm of causation as it is understood in 
the common law .... [l]n this instance the state has licensed 
commercial fishing operations to use gillnets and lobster pots 
in specifically the manner that is likely to result in a violation 
of federal law ... it is not possible for a licensed commercial 
fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the 
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without the risk of 
violating the ESA by exacting a taking. Thus, the state's 
licensure of gillnet and lobster pot fishing does not involve 
the intervening independent actor.240 
Several courts have applied this principle, imposing liability on a 
governmental body that authorizes a taking by another person. For example, 
local governmental bodies were liable for takings of protected animals 
committed directly by privately-owned motor vehicles operating on coastal 
beaches with the permission of the local governmental body, when the local 
government has authority to regulate the operation of privately-owned motor 
vehicles on coastal beaches within its jurisdiction.241 
Another court has implicitly applied this principle to hold the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") liable for a prohibited 
taking in violation of the ESA caused by protected animals eating strychnine-
239 Strahan, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978 (1998). 
240 /d. at 164. 
241 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Vol usia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1181-83 
(M.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 
1998). 
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laced rodent bait (that could only be distributed and used because EPA 
registered the bait under federal law).242 Another holding found the 
Department of Interior liable for takings of bald eagles· in violation of the 
ESA caused by eagles ingesting lead shot when eating prey that had been 
killed by hunters shooting lead shot (which the Department authorized 
hunters to use in hunting the eagles' prey).243 
A governmental entity is not liable, however, for an ESA-prohibited 
taking committed by a person operating a vessel or vehicle, where the 
governmental entity merely has permitted or authorized that person to 
operate the vessel or vehicle by licensing or registering the vessel or vehicle 
and licensed its operator or driver to operate the vessel or vehicle. In such 
situations the vessel or vehicle "owner or operator is an independent actor 
who is, himself, responsible for complying with environmental and other 
laws."244 
In dictum, in a case involving the issue of whether a county council 
is liable under the ESA for takings of protected sea turtles caused by county-
regulated, privately-owned artificial beachfront lighting sources that disorient 
and harm turtles on nearby beaches, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit has stated that a local governmental body can be liable 
under the ESA for a prohibited taking of a protected animal, which was 
242 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 ·F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989). 
243 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985). In addition, 
the United States Forest Service has been held liable for takings of protected birds in 
violation of the ESA that were caused by private timber companies harvesting timber in 
national forests with the authorization of the Forest Service. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. 
Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club v. 
Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
244 Strahan v. Linnon, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, *14 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998) (Coast 
Guard held not liable for takings of whales by non-Coast Guard vessels that the Coast Guard 
permits to operate in navigable waters by issuance of Certificates of Documentation and 
Inspection). See also Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163-64 (1stCir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 978 (1998), stating in dictum that a state is not liable for takings committed by 
automobiles and their drivers licensed by the state, since 
it is possible for a person licensed by [the state] to use a car in a manner 
that does not risk ... violations of federal law .... Where the state has 
licensed an automobile driver to use that automobile and her license in a 
manner consistent with both state and federal law, the violation of federal 
law is caused only by the actor's conscious and independent decision to 
disregard or go beyond the licensed purposes of her automobile use and 
instead to violate federal ... law. (dicta) 
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directly caused by the actions of a private person, when that person's actions 
are the proximate result of the governmental body's '"harmfully' inadequate 
regulation" of that person's conduct.245 Although the Eleventh Circuit did not 
define "harmfully inadequate regulation" in this case, the court suggested 
that "harmfully inadequate regulation" would be established if a statute or 
ordinance were "(insufficient on [its] face to prevent 'harm') to [the 
protected animals] .... "246 The Eleventh Circuit also referred to the issue of 
whether a governmental body engaged in "full and complete enforcement" 
of an ordinance that was sufficient on its face to prevent "harm" and takings 
in violation of the ESA.247 
"Harmfully inadequate regulation" should be found to exist either 
when a governmental body's statute, ordinance or regulation is insufficient 
on its face to prevent "harm" and "takings" by regulated persons, or when a 
facially sufficient statute, ordinance or regulation is not fully and completely 
enforced by the governmental body (resulting in prohibited takings in 
violation of the ESA by the persons regulated by the statute, ordinance, or 
regulation). 
A governmental regulatory program that explicitly prohibits regulated 
individuals and corporations from engaging in acts that proximately cause 
prohibited takings of protected animals in violation of the ESA, nevertheless 
should be considered to be "harmfully inadequate" and the proximate cause 
of any prohibited takings that are directly caused by a regulated individual 
or corporation in one of two ways: first, if there is a finding that the 
regulatory program on its face has substantive inadequacies (such as 
exemptions or defenses that nullify substantive prohibitions) that are 
proximate (foreseeable and "but for") causes of the prohibited takings; 
second, if the governmental body's implementation and enforcement of the 
program has inadequacies that are foreseeable and "but for" causes of the 
prohibited takings. Governmental enforcement measures should not be found 
to be inadequate if the governmental body is implementing reasonable 
enforcement measures in view of the financial resources available to the 
governmental body and other obligations and duties of the governmental 
body, even if some takings are being caused by acts of regulated persons in 
violation of the regulatory program. 
24~ Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1249 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
246 /d. at 1250. 
247 Id. 
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This theory does not seek to hold a governmental entity liable for a 
taking in violation of the ESA on the basis of a failure by the governmental 
entity to adequately regulate the actions of the private person that directly 
caused the taking. Rather, under the theory, a governmental entity is liable 
only for a prohibited taking directly caused by another person when the 
taking is the proximate result of the governmental body's affirmative, but 
"harmfully inadequate," regulation of those actions of the private person. In 
order for a governmental body to avoid liability under this theory, the 
governmental body must amend its existing "harmfully inadequate" 
regulations that are permitting private persons to engage in actions that cause 
prohibited takings of protected animals, so that the governmental body's 
amended regulations, on their face and as enforced, prohibit the actions by 
private persons that cause the takings of protected animals in violation of the 
ESA. Of course, a governmental body can avoid such liability for "harmfully 
inadequate regulation" in two ways. Liability may be avoided by not 
affirmatively enacting that type of regulatory program or by abrogating an 
existing regulatory program that has been found to be "harmfully 
inadequate," unless the governmental body has an affirmative obligation 
under federal, state, or local law to enact and enforce an adequate regulatory 
program of the type, so that the governmental body might be liable under the 
FWS regulation defining "harm" for its omission (its failure to enact and 
enforce an adequate regulatory program that prevents the takings in violation 
of the ESA).248 
After the remand of the artificial beachfront lighting and sea turtle 
case from the Eleventh Circuit to the District Court, the District Court held 
that the takings of protected sea turtles in violation of the ESA were being 
caused by privately-owned artificial beachfront lighting sources and that the 
county council was not liable for these takings under the theory of "harmfully 
inadequate" regulation.249 The basis for this holding was that the county's 
affirmative acts of adopting and enforcing an ordinance to protect sea turtles 
from privately owned artificial beachfront lighting sources did not 
proximately cause the prohibited takings of sea turtles. The District Court 
reasoned that although the county's ordinance banned on its beaches light 
from artificial lighting sources, protected sea turtles were being harmed by 
light on the county beaches from artificial lighting sources because the 
248 A person's liability for an omission or failure to act under the FWS regulation defining 
"harm" is discussed supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. 
249 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 
2000). 
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county's "beach residents are not turning off their lights in compliance with 
the ordinance."250 The District Court did not consider whether "harmfully 
inadequate" enforcement of this ordinance by the county council was the 
proximate cause of private persons not turning off their artificial lighting 
sources in compliance with the ordinance, because the Court held that 
"Plaintiffs' case is not based upon the County's failure to enforce the sea 
turtle protection ordinance, nor do Plaintiffs contend that an alleged failure 
to enforce the ordinance would violate the ESA."251 
Professor J .B. Ruhl has argued that the principle that holds a 
governmental body liable for a taking caused by another person acting with 
governmental authorization or with inadequate governmental regulation 
imposes vicarious liability without sound legal basis under the ESA.252 This 
kind of governmental liability, however, is not vicarious liability, but rather 
liability based either upon a governmental body's affirmative act of 
authorizing or permitting an action by another person that proximately takes 
an animal protected by the ESA or upon a governmental body's affirmative 
act of regulating the acts of other persons in a harmfully inadequate manner 
that causes prohibited takings in violation of the ESA. Furthermore, 
imposition of liability upon a governmental body in such situations is a 
reasonable interpretation and application of the FWS regulation defining 
"harm," because such governmental liability is based upon traditional and . 
ordinary common law tort principles of foreseeability, proximate causation, 
and "but for" causation. 
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,253 
a private person cannot bring a suit in federal district court, under the ESA's 
citizen suit provision254 or otherwise, against a state or an "arm" of a state, 
seeking an injunction to enforce the ESA's takings prohibitions. The 
Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits a private person from bringing a 
suit in federal court against a nonconsenting state255 or "arm" of a state.256 
250 /d. at 1307. 
251 /d. 
m J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, 16 NAT. 
REsOURCES & ENV'T., Fall 2001, at 70. 
253 U.S. CON ST. amend. XI, (''The Judicial power of the United states shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."). 
254 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g) (2000). 
255 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 72 (1996). 
256 Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1996). This case names 
a number of factors to be considered by a court in determining whether a suit by a private 
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The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar a private person's suit in 
federal court against a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of 
a state.257 It also does not immunize a state or an "arm" of a state from being 
sued in federal court by either the United States258 or by another state.259 
Either the federal government (in a suit under section ll(e)(6)260 of the ESA) 
or another state (in a suit under the ESA's citizen suit provision) could 
enforce the ESA's takings prohibitions against a state or an "arm" of a state 
in a suit filed in federal district court.261 
A state or local governmental body's liability in a federal court for 
violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions also may be limited by the Tenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution or by separation of powers 
rules.262 A federal court may exceed its powers if it issues an injunction 
requiring a state or local governmental body to enact and enforce "a 
particular regulatory regime that enforces and furthers a federal policy,"263 
party against a governmental entity is a prohibited suit against an "ann" of a state, including: 
( 1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how 
the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is 
funded; (4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or 
state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity's 
actions; and (6) whether the entity's obligations are binding upon the state. 
/d. at 293. 
251 Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
258 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 
U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). 
259 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.12 (1972). The Eleventh Amendment, 
however, does bar a suit by a plaintiff state against another state when the plaintiff state 
actually is suing as a trustee on behalf of its individual citizens to obtain damages for them 
for their individual claims. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365,375-76 (1923); New 
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1883). 
260 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6). 
261 Pursuant to section 6(t), 16 U.S.C. § 1535(t), of the ESA (providing that the ESA shall 
not be construed to void state laws or regulations intended to conserve fish or wildlife and 
permits state laws or regulations respecting the taking of a protected species to be more 
restrictive than the ESA or regulations under the ESA), a state has the authority to enact 
legislation authorizing its state courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits against the state or 
an "ann" of the state to enforce the ESA's takings prohibitions. 
262 See generally Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 
1253-55 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1081(1999); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 
169 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978(1998); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 
F.2d 1294, 1298 (8th Cir. 1989). 
263 Strahan, 127 F.3d at 169. 
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although a ·federal court in an appropriate case can issue an injunction 
prohibiting a state or local governmental body from continuing to enforce a 
particular existing regulatory program until it can do so without violating the 
ESA's takings prohibitions264 or an injunction requiring state or local 
governmental officials to find a means of bringing a governmental body's 
regulatory program into compliance with federallaw. 265 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The word "injures" in the FWS regulation defining "harm" should be 
interpreted to include significant adverse impacts upon a protected animal's 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering, as well as a physical injury, wound or 
disease. However, in order for habitat modification to constitute "harm" 
under the FWS regulation, the habitat modification must not only 
significantly impair an animal's breeding, feeding or sheltering but also must 
otherwise kill or injure the animal. Significant impairment of an animal's 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering by habitat modification by itself should not 
be sufficient to constitute an injury under the FWS regulation defining 
"harm." Courts should, permit, however, an animal's habitat and injury to an 
animal from habitat modification or degradation to be established either by 
the opinions of expert scientific witnesses or by circumstantial evidence. 
264 Defenders of Wildlife, 882 F.2d at 1298. 
265 Strahan, 127 F.3d at 170. 
